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A NOTE ON ROWE'S "RESPONSE TO DICKER" 
Georges Dicker 
I am inclined to accept Rowe's ingenious demonstration that Anselm's (own) 
argument begs the question, no less than the "Son of Anselm's Argument.'" 
However, I would dispute the way in which Rowe represents the relation between 
his position and mine. He writes: 
Dicker['s] ... position is that Anselm's argument does not fall prey 
to the objection of question-begging I advanced against the Son of 
Anselm's argument. Against Dicker, however, I shall argue that 
Anselm's argument does fall prey to the objection of question-begging 
I advanced against the Son of Anselm's argument. 2 
This implies that while my position is that Anselm's argument, unlike the Son of 
Anselm's Argument, does not beg the question, Rowe has shown that it does. But 
my position is, rather, that Anselm's argument does not beg the question in the way 
that the Son of Anselm's Argument begs it (by virtue of premiss 2, that God is a pos-
sible thing). That is why, as I put it, Rowe's original article leaves Anselm's own 
argument "unscathed.'" Now this criticism leaves quite open the possibility that 
Anselm's argument begs the question in some other way. Rowe's "Response" 
seems to show that Anselm's argument does indeed beg the question in another way 
(by virtue of premiss 1, that God exists in the understanding). Of course there is a 
resemblance between the two cases of question-begging: in both cases asserting 
that God has a certain status~ither as a possible thing, or as a thing in the under-
standing-turns out to be tantamount to asserting that He exists in reality. But the 
two casesare nonetheless distinct. So far as I can see, then, the position in my 
paper and the one in Rowe's response to it are not incompatible.' 
SUNY at Brockport 
NOTES 
1. William L. Rowe, "Response to Dicker," Faith and Philosophy, Vol. 5, No.2, pp-204-205. 
2. "Response to Dicker," 204. 
3. Georges Dicker, "A Refutation of Rowe's Critique of Anselm's Ontological Argument." Faith 
and Philosophy, Vol. 5, No.2, p. 193. 
4. Admittedly, however, the last two sentences of my paper require qualification if Rowe is right 
in thinking that Anselm's premiss 7 begs the question. 
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